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Closing the Side-Door: An Argument for 
Imposing a Duty of Oversight on University 
Boards of Trustees 
Simone van Ommeren-Akelman1 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 12, 2019, Operation Varsity Blues and the corresponding 
charges were made public.2 The investigation, spearheaded by United 
States federal prosecutors, revealed the largest-ever college admissions 
bribery scheme.3 The investigation drew public attention not only because 
the scandal included several celebrities, but also because it shined a light 
on money and the influence it has on college admissions.4 
In brief, the scandal involved manipulating the college admissions 
process to improve admission chances for weaker students with a lot of 
parental resources. Central to the scheme was Rick Singer, the mastermind 
behind the operation.5 One favored strategy was to rig admissions tests, 
where Singer would either coerce the proctor into allowing students more 
time on the SAT or ACT, or even specially place proctors in the exam room 
that would interfere with exam results.6 Another was to bribe athletic 
1. Simone van Ommeren-Akelman, Juris Doctor, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, 2020; B.A. in Political Science with an Emphasis in American Politics 
and a Minor in English, University of California, Davis, 2017. To my mom and dad, who 
taught me the definition of tenacity through their own actions and instilled in me the value 
of education. To Kylee Cecchini and Athena Kautsch, who have served as life-long role 
models in their advocacy for justice and their promotion of youth voices. To Malwine van 
Ommeren, who has made a lifetime of sacrifices to afford me the opportunity of pursuing 
my dreams. And finally, to Rory Houghton-Berry, who has never wavered in his belief in 
me and inspires me simply by the nature of his being. Fiat Lux. Fiat Justitia. 
2. Graham Kates, Lori Loughlin and Felicity Huffman among dozens charged in
college bribery scheme, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019, 8:35 PM), https://www.cbsnews. 
com/news/college-admissions-scandal-bribery-cheating-today-felicity-huffman-arrested-fb 
i-2019-03-12/ [https://perma.cc/N8H7-646L].
3. Maria Puente & Joey Garrison, Felicity Huffman released on bail after allegedly
bribing to get kid into college as part of sweeping admissions scandal, USA TODAY (Mar. 
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coaches. Singer would doctor photos and create athletic profiles for 
students who were by no means athletes, and thereby used the “side-door” 
of athletic recruiting.7 An essential component of Rick Singer’s scheme 
was complicit administrative members of the United States’ top 
universities. There is clearly room for significant oversight in the 
admissions process, but these schools currently benefit too much from 
wealthy parents to enforce such oversight from their own initiative.  
If a scandal such as Varsity Blues were to happen in a corporate 
environment, alarm bells would sound. Shareholders would file derivative 
suits, attempting to pierce the corporate veil. The news would be reporting 
on the violations of fiduciary duties and inherent corruption. When Elon 
Musk tweeted misleading information about taking Tesla private, the media 
immediately jumped on the opportunity to hold Musk accountable for his 
actions within the company.8 The same standards of responsibility are not 
replicated in Varsity Blues—both because there is a gap in the application 
of fiduciary duties to non-profit organizations, and because there is 
arguably too much latitude in the college admissions process.  
It is only recently that public corporations have been expected by law 
to maintain oversight over their companies. In a 1996 opinion, the Supreme 
Court ruled that directors are potentially liable for a breach of duty to 
exercise appropriate attention if they knew or should have known that 
employees were violating the law, declined to make a good faith effort to 
prevent the violation, and the lack of action was the proximate cause of 
damages.9 The Caremark precedent, however, only applies to public 
corporations and their respective boards of trustees. The universities in 
Varsity Blues have benefitted from the law not yet broadening the fiduciary 
net to encompass non-profits as well. Otherwise, court precedent would 
point to the various Boards of Trustees having violated fiduciary duties by 
turning a blind eye to the practice of bribing for college admission. Thus, 
there seems to be a drastic need to address the lack of fiduciary duties in 
both non-profit governance and by extension, as well as university 
governance. 
With this background, the present article analyzes the potential 
extension of Caremark to non-profits, with a special focus on the university 
organizational form that was at issue in the Varsity Blues scandal.  While 
Varsity Blues has returned this issue to prominence, scholars and lawyers 
have long been concerned with non-profit governance. This Note will use 
that research to examine whether the Caremark duty of oversight can be 
7. Id.
8. Alan Ohnsman, Elon Musks’ Bombshell Tweets About Taking Tesla Private
Trigger SEC Review, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
alanohnsman/2018/08/08/elon-musks-bombshell-tweets-about-taking-tesla-private-said-to-
trigger-sec-review/#61e344c0c37b [https://perma.cc/P3TE-Y54E]. 
9. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (1996).
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extended to boards of trustees, and if so, how responsibility can be imposed 
on directors to exercise their fiduciary duties. Part I examines the structure 
of the corporate university and the variety in the structure of boards. Part II 
analyzes the current fiduciary duties of Boards of Trustees as well as the 
overlay of the business judgment rule and standing of potential claimants. 
Part III presents an overview of the application of law as applied to the 
Varsity Blues scandal and provides a possible resolution for the lack of 
oversight through the imposition of liability or through the incentivization 
of ethical gatekeepers, while offering countering views as to why such 
strategies have yet to be applied.  Part V concludes. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY 
The Creation of the Parallel Worlds of Corporate Evolution and 
University Evolution 
While there are many differences between corporations and 
universities, the similarities between the two allow universities to be 
considered under the umbrella of corporate law. The foundation of 
American corporate law was incidentally decided in a lawsuit where a 
private college prevailed in protecting its corporate charter from state 
control.10 In 1819, New Hampshire wanted to take control of a private 
college–Dartmouth–and felt justified in doing so because they supported 
Dartmouth through chartering and support.11 The Supreme Court held that 
the New Hampshire state legislature’s efforts to seize Dartmouth College 
were illegal, thereby rendering the charter imposed by King George valid.12 
In essence, upholding the original charter meant that the court recognized 
it as a contract. In the case, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that a 
corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creation of law, it poses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, 
or as incidental to its very existence.”13 Through his opinion, Chief Justice 
Marshall reaffirmed the importance of contracts under the US Constitution 
as “it … play[ed] a key role in the rise of the American business 
corporation.”14 Thus, through the limitation of state control of private 
institutions, the deference to the university charter was born.  
Accordingly, private universities were able to create their own 
methods of governance through their charters. The organization of 
10. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 524 (1819).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 636.
13. Id.
14. R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as a Transitional Jurist: Dartmouth College v.
Woodward and the Limits of Omniscient Judging, 32 CON. L. REV. 1665, 1666 (2000). 
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universities is typically described rather simply: a board of trustees receives 
a charter from the state, selects a president, and approves a faculty to teach 
and to select the students.15 However, this simplicity is a façade.16 
“Organizationally the university is . . . one of the most complex structures 
in modern society; it is also increasingly archaic. It is complex because its 
formal structure does not describe either actual power or responsibilities; it 
is archaic because the functions it must perform are not and cannot be 
discharged through the formal structure provided in its charter.”17 
The Lack of Formalized Rules and Standards for the Behavior of 
Trustees 
In addition to the lack of formalized structure, the duties of a trustee 
have never been standardized and enforced. Louis Heilbron, the first chair 
of the Board of Trustees of the California State Colleges (now universities), 
tried to capture the essence of the duty of a trustee when he said, “The key 
part of the trustee’s title is (or should be) the word trust. He holds something 
valuable in trust – the classrooms, the libraries . . . the institution itself – for 
high purposes and benefits, not for himself, but for others.”18 The precise 
discernment of duties, however, is still a substantially gray area. “Unlike 
the for-profit corporate boards, whose main objective is to increase 
shareholder value, the mission-based nonprofit universities must satisfy 
different sets of constituencies, including students, employees, alumni, 
donors, public officials, and society at large.”19  
With a universal objective not clearly codified, the role of the trustee 
is open ended, rendering liability for improper acts virtually impossible. 
The following duties, at a minimum, have been identified but not codified: 
Protecting the welfare of the individual institution and its missions;20 
Protecting the institution autonomy from external economic and 
political forces;21 
Protecting the academic freedom of the institution’s members;22 
15. JAMES A. PERKINS, THE UNIVERSITY AS AN ORGANIZATION 3 (1973).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. LOUIS HEILBRON, THE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY TRUSTEE: A VIEW FROM THE
BOARD ROOM 3 (1973). 
19. Salar Ghahramani, Fiduciary Duty and the Ex Officio Conundrum in Corporate
Governance: The Troublesome Murkiness of the Gubernatorial Trustee’s Obligations, 10
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (2014). 
20. CLARK KERR & MARION GRADE, THE GUARDIANS: BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF
AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 12 (1989). 
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Ensuring adequate resources;23 and 
Considering the public welfare.24 
These points are not exhaustive; they merely encapsulate what is the 
bare minimum norm of an existing Board of Trustees. Each university has 
their own objectives, and are tasked with the endeavor of confronting, 
defining, and tackling each problem. “For instance, should the board’s 
performance be based on evaluating teaching effectiveness? Enrollments? 
Enhanced educational quality? Reputation? Revenue? Research and 
innovation? Accessibility? Societal impact? The fact that these criteria may 
at times be competing objectives can complicate the evaluation of the 
board’s performance.”25  
THE REGULATION OF BOARDS OF TRUSTEES 
While university trustees are now considered fiduciaries, that hasn’t 
always been the case. This section will examine the origins and extension 
of fiduciary duties, and how they came to be applied to university boards 
of trustees. 
Overview 
A fiduciary is one who “often [is] in a position of authority who 
obligates himself or herself to act on behalf of another (as in managing 
money or property) and assumes a duty to act in good faith and with care, 
candor, and loyalty in fulfilling the obligation.”26 The need for a fiduciary 
relationship between members directing any type of organization has been 
well recognized, even before the creation of the United States 
Constitution.27 As such, the responsibilities of a fiduciary are well 
established in the law. 
One of the cornerstones of fiduciary law within the United States was 
created in Meinhard v. Salmon.28 The court held, in application to a joint 
real estate venture where one partner took advantage of the financial 
benefits of the partnership, that the co-venturers had a fiduciary duty to 
each other.29 Judge Cardozo wrote, “Many forms of conduct permissible in 
a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those 
23. RICHARD T. INGRAM, GOVERNING PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: A
HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES, CHIEF EXECUTIVES, AND OTHER CAMPUS LEADERS 93, 102 
(Richard T. Ingram ed., 1993). 
24. Kerr & Grade, supra note 20.
25. Ghahramani, supra note 19, at 9.
26. Fiduciary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER LEGAL DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
27. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV.
117, 123-24 (2006). 
28. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
29. Id.
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bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has 
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate . . .”30 
Fiduciary relationships have expanded in application, and now even 
include relationships between “a trustee and beneficiary, a guardian and 
ward, an agent and principal, a lawyer and client, a member of the clergy 
and a parishioner, a director and a corporation, a partner and other partners, 
an employer and an employee, and a broker and client.”31 As a result, the 
fiduciary duties have multiplied and grown in murkiness, as they now apply 
to a sea of relationships.32  
While rooted in concepts such as good faith, trust, and confidence, the 
duties that courts have categorized under the rubric of fiduciary duty are 
many and varied, and are often described in very lofty terms. These duties 
include the duty not to commit fraud, not to engage in self-dealing, to be 
loyal, obedient, diligent, and exercise good faith, to disclose material 
information and to exercise care and prudence, among others.33 
Fiduciary Obligations of Non-Profit Organizations and 
Universities 
Historically, however, courts have struggled to articulate the fiduciary 
expectations of directors and officers of non-profit organizations.34 The 
roots of nonprofit corporate law began at the intersection of trust law and 
corporate law,35 but through the counsel of the American Bar Association 
and the American Law Institute, as well as state imposed regulation, 
charitable corporate law and charitable trusts began to take two separate 
paths.36  
The final separation of corporate law and trust law occurred in Oberly 
v. Kirby, where the court recognized both parallels and distinguishing
factors between for-profit corporations and non-profit corporations. In this
case, the Supreme Court of Delaware found that the fiduciary duty of a
30. Id.
31. Brett G. Scharfs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and 
Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159, 163 (2005). 
32. Scharfs & Welch, supra note 31, at 162.
33. Id.
34. Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-
Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1133-40 (2001). 
35. Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate
Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 597 (1999). 
36. See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (Am. Bar Ass’n 1952); MODEL NONPROFIT 
CORP. ACT (Am. Bar Ass’n 1964); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (Am. Bar Ass’n 2008); 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS (Am. Bar Ass’n 2005 and 2007);. Rev. MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (Am. Bar Ass’n 1987). 
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non-profit board member is “measured under standards developed in the 
jurisprudence of for-profit corporations.”37 In finding this, they recognized 
the need for deference in decision-making for strategic purposes, and that 
the business judgment rule applied to the directors of a non-profit 
corporation.38 However, they noted that non-profit corporations are 
generally for limited charitable purposes, whereas for-profit corporations 
are for larger and more inclusive purposes.39 Reflecting on that, the court 
found that the fiduciary duty of a non-profit is determined by tailoring the 
duty to the nonprofit corporation’s purpose.40 “The Oberly decision, 
therefore, indicates that principles of corporate law will govern the 
activities of the governing body, but the fiduciaries have a ‘special duty’ to 
advance the goals and purposes of the nonprofit corporation.”41 
The Duty of Loyalty 
Fiduciary duties are broken into two independent duties: the duty of 
loyalty and the duty of care. This section will analyze in detail the duty of 
loyalty. The duty of care will be addressed in the subsequent section. 
The duty of loyalty and duty of care significantly overlapped until 
Guth v. Loft clarified the definition of the duty of loyalty.42 In a 1939 ruling, 
the Delaware court defined the duty of loyalty as affirmatively protecting 
the interests of the corporation as well as refraining from engaging in 
anything that might bring injury to the corporation.43 In addition, the case 
said that directors must not divide loyalties between the corporation and 
other entities.44 
The duty of loyalty also requires acting in good faith and 
“maintain[ing] . . . unequivocal allegiance to the corporate mission.”45 The 
duty of loyalty is largely centered around acting in the best interest of the 
company by avoiding conflicts of interest.46 Traditionally, we distinguish 
37. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 461 (Del. 1991).
38. Id. at 466.
39. Id. at 462.
40. Id.
41. Mary A. Jacobson, Commentary to Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate
Law: Nonprofit Corporations: Conversion to For-Profit Corporate Status & Nonprofit 
Corporation Members’ Rights – Farahpour V. DCX, Inc., 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 635 (1995). 
42. Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate
Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U.L. REV. 
701, 738 (2001). 
43. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
44. Id.
45. Michael W. Peregrine, Legal Concerns in Specific Health Care Deliver Settings:
Nonprofit Corporate Governance, 3 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE 43, §22 (2010). 
46. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Noprofit Corporate
Governance – A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 347, 381 (2012).
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the duty of loyalty from the duty of care by recognizing that “disloyal acts 
are generally intentional, although indifference to protect the organization 
or abdication and dereliction of duties are sufficient to establish breach of 
duty of loyalty.”47  
The Duty of Care 
The duty of care requires directors to exercise good faith and 
diligence,48 which is applied to nonprofit corporations and for-profit 
corporations alike.49 The duty of care usually has the flavor of self-dealing, 
while the duty of loyalty has the flavor of wearing two hats at the same 
time. 
The duty of care, as applied to nonprofit corporations, was later 
codified in the Model Nonprofit Corporate Act, which asserts: A director 
shall discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her duties as 
a member of a committee: 
In good faith; 
With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position 
would exercise under similar circumstances; and 
In a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation.50 
One caveat to the duty of care is that the business judgment rule 
protects decisions that are made with the belief that the decision is in the 
best interest of the corporation.51 Courts have repeatedly maintained a strict 
standard of non-interference, unless “it be made to appear that . . . acts were 
fraudulent or collusive, and destructive of the rights of the stockholders. 
Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as grounds for equity 
interference, for the powers entrusted with corporate management are 
largely discretionary.”52 As such, liability may not be imposed on directors 
if there is no claim of gross negligence.53 
47. Ghahramani, supra note 19, at 16.
48. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 232
(2003). 
49. See Bishop, supra note 42, at 703-04.
50. REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 3 (1987).
51. See Bishop, supra note 42, at 730.
52. Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519, 532 (1888).
53. In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 634 (3d. Cir. 2015).
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Effects of the Business Judgment Rule on the Fiduciary Duties of 
Care and Loyalty 
While the duty of loyalty and duty of care place broad responsibilities 
on directors’ shoulders, the business judgment rule was created to free 
directors to make business decisions that they rationally believed was in the 
best interest of the corporation.54 The only qualification for the business 
judgment rule to remove liability for an error is that the decision was made 
with due care and in good faith.55 In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware 
Supreme Court found that the determination of compliance with the duty 
of care cannot be made in reference to the content of the loss without 
consideration of rationality or good faith.56 Egregious mistakes are still 
protected by the business judgment rule so long as they were made in good 
faith or with a rational belief that the decision was in the best interest of the 
corporation.57 The underlying idea behind this is to give directors wide 
decision-making latitude in taking steps to benefit a corporation, which 
incentivizes “corporate innovation and rational risk-taking”58 whilst 
limiting judicial intrusiveness.”59 In fact, this rule has been not only been 
applied to for-profit corporations but non-profit entities as well. 
The Build-Up of In re Caremark and the Expansion of the Duty of 
Care 
The law began to place requirements on the conduct of directors of 
for-profit corporations in Barnes v. Andrews, where the court held that a 
director has fiduciary duties to remain informed of business-related 
problems.60 The suit focused around a passive director defendant, who the 
shareholders elected on to the board and on whom they placed the burden 
of guilt for the business not being successful.61 In a famous opinion, Judge 
Learned Hand noted that it would be unfair to hold a director liable for an 
unsuccessful business, as directors are “not specialists like lawyers or 
doctors . . . they are general advisors of the business.”62 
In addition, Judge Learned Hand notes the importance of shareholders 
attention in selection of corporate directors. If a corporate director is chosen 
who is not well-suited for the position, shareholders cannot be particularly 
54. See American law Institution, Principle of Corporate Governance §5.01(c).
55. See Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder
Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 194 (1997). 
56. Id.
57. McGinty, supra note 55.
58. Ghahramani, supra note 19, at 19.
59. Id.
60. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 614 (1924).
61. Id. at 618.
62. Id.
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surprised when he doesn’t execute his job as well as they had hoped.63 The 
case is largely an embodiment of the Business Judgment Rule in that it 
centers around good faith efforts, and it starts to bring in inklings of the 
duty of oversight because it begs the question of whether good faith 
encompasses a duty to be informed as a component of exercising 
judgment.64 
This question raised by the penumbras of Barnes v. Andrews gave 
fodder to a new component of the duty of care through In re Caremark 
Intern. Inc. Derivative Litigation, where the court found a duty of 
oversight.65 In Caremark, two officers employed by Caremark were 
indicted because they participated in a kickback program with a 
physician.66 Caremark had paid $1.1 million to a Minneapolis based 
physician to encourage him to prescribe and distribute Protropin, a human 
growth hormone made by Genentech and marketed by Caremark.67 The 
payments started in 1986 and continued through 1993, and were hidden in 
cloaks of grant funds or consulting agreements.68 Following the 
indictments, the Board was subsequently informed and denied any claim of 
wrongdoing. After the news broke about the first indictment, a slew of other 
kickback agreements came to light.69 While Caremark worked to settle the 
claims, the shareholders were unhappy with the management of the 
company, and filed a derivative action to both judge the fairness of the 
settlement and simultaneously hold the directors responsible for not 
monitoring the inner workings of the company.70 For the purpose of this 
paper, the discussion of Caremark will focus on the latter part of the 
aforementioned judgment. 
The basis of the shareholders claims regarding directorial 
responsibility rested in the duty of care.71 Specifically, the shareholders 
claimed that the “directors allowed a situation to develop and continue 
which exposed the corporation to enormous legal liability and in so doing 
they violated a duty to actively monitor corporate performance.”72 Liability 
for breach of the duty to exercise appropriate attention arises in two distinct 
situations: 
When a board decision causes a loss because the decision was 
ill advised or “negligent” 
63. Id.
64. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (1996).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 964.
67. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 964.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 965.
71. Id. at 967.
72. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 964.
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When an unconsidered failure of the board to act in 
circumstances in which due attention would have prevented.73 
In addressing the second question, the court proposed an 
extension of the duty of care when they posed the question, “what is 
the board’s responsibility with respect to the organization and 
monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the corporation functions 
within the law to achieve its purposes?”74 
The court deviated from an earlier holding in Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers that “absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the 
directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out 
wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”75 In Caremark, 
the court held that the board of directors’ have a duty to be “reasonably 
informed concerning the corporation,” which requires that the board ensure 
“that information and reporting systems exist in the organization that are 
reasonably designed to provide . . . timely, accurate information sufficient 
to allow . . . the board . . . to reach informed judgments concerning both the 
corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.”76  
Chancellor Allen justified the “refinement” of Allis-Chalmers in a 
three-part rationale. First, he outlined the over-arching shift in the 
importance of the board of directors, both in guiding the company as well 
as protecting shareholder interests. Second, he cited Delaware Corporation 
Law Section 141, which requires relevant and timely information to satisfy 
the board’s duty to monitor. Lastly, he noted the impact of the federal 
sentencing guidelines on corporations. “Any rational person attempting in 
good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be 
bound to take into account this development and the enhanced penalties and 
the opportunities for reduced sanctions that it offers.”77 
Since the Caremark decision, the court has only continued to 
strengthen the opinion that corporations have a duty to monitor the 
innerworkings of the company, regardless of company size or how far 
removed the board of directors are. In 2006, the court identified specific 
non-exhaustive examples of a violation of oversight liability, which 
includes things such as, “where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the 
face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his 
duties.” A full enunciation of a Caremark claim was detailed in an 
unpublished opinion in 2016, when the Delaware Chancery Court wrote 
that plaintiffs need to show either:  
73. Id.
74. Id. at 969.
75. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963).
76. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 970.
77. Paul E. Fiorelli, Why Comply? Directors face heightened personal liability after
Caremark, 41 BUSINESS HORIZONS 49 (July/Aug. 1998). 
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(1) That the directors knew, or (2) should have known that violations
of law were occurring and, in either event, (3) that the directors took no 
steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that 
such failure approximately resulted in the losses complained of.78 
Further strengthening Caremark were the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines passed by Congress in 1984,79 which Chancellor Allen 
recognized the importance of in his three-part refinement.80 In his 
Caremark analysis, Chancellor Allen indicated that through the 
implementation of guidelines, companies will move towards federal 
compliance. “[T]he Guidelines offer powerful incentives for corporations 
today to have in place compliance programs to detect violations of law, 
promptly report violations to the appropriate public officials when 
discovered, and take prompt, voluntary remedial efforts.”81 The guidelines 
were amended in 1991 and 2004 to include organizational offenders, in 
addition to individuals.82 To comply with the sentencing guidelines that the 
United States Sentencing Commission established, a corporation must: 
Establish adequate compliance standards and procedures to 
reduce the prospect of criminal conduct; 
Assign high-level personnel to oversee the compliance 
program, such as an ethics officer, ombudsman, or compliance 
officer; 
Use due care not to delegate substantial responsibility to a 
person with a propensity to engage in illegal activities; 
Communicate compliance procedures through publications 
(code of ethics, standards of conduct) or training; 
Audit its compliance programs and maintain a violation 
reporting system; 
Consistently enforce its compliance programs and not favor 
star employees; and 
Respond reasonably to an offense and modify the program to 
prevent future offenses.83 
In addition to these guidelines, the United States Sentencing 
Commission also defined “organization” in order to determine who these 
guidelines applied to. They defined organization as, “a person other than an 
individual . . . [which] includes corporations, partnerships, associations, 
78. Reiter v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at 7, (Del. Ch. Oct. 18,
2016). 
79. See Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984, 18 U.S.C.A §3551 (1984).
80. Fiorelli, supra note 77.
81. In re Caremark Derivative Action, 698 A.2d at 969.
82. Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 79.
83. Fiorelli, supra note 77.
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joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated 
organizations, governments and political subdivisions thereof, and non-
profit organizations.”84 
EXTENSION OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS TO THE  
NONPROFIT SECTOR 
The enforcement of fiduciary duties within nonprofits (both charitable 
trusts and nonprofit corporations) is through public enforcement by state 
attorney generals,85 through the special interest doctrine,86 or through a 
derivative suit. 
State attorney generals are empowered by statutory law to supervise 
nonprofits and enforce fiduciary duties to protect the public interest.87 
Much of the actual supervision is limited, however, due to “lack of funds 
and resources.”88 “[State attorney generals] have neither the person-power, 
nor sometimes the will, to monitor nonprofits effectively.”89 
As such, the special interest doctrine is used to empower the private 
individual.90 If a person has a “special interest” in the organization, they 
will be allowed standing to sue.91 According to a 1993 study, special 
interest status is granted by considering the five following factors: 
The extraordinary nature of the acts complained of and the 
remedy sought by the plaintiff; 
the presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the charity 
or its directors;  
the state attorney general’s availability or effectiveness;  
the nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to the 
charity; 
subjective and case-specific factual circumstances and social 
desirability.92 
If a special interest plaintiff is granted standing to sue, they 
must seek relief in the form of a “benefit to the charity itself and not 
money damages for the plaintiffs.”93 
84. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8A1.1 (2018).
85. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 43-48 (Harvard University Press, 2008). 
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUST § 391 (1959).
87. See Gary, supra note 35, at 622.
88. Ghahramani, supra note 19, at 21.
89. Fishman, supra, note 48, at 268.
90. See Gary, supra note 35, at 627.
91. Id.
92. Mary Grace Blasko, et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 37, 61 (1993). 
93. See Gary, supra note 35, at 627.
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Suits Against Boards of Trustees 
Automatic standing is only granted to state attorney generals.94 
Standing is otherwise permitted on a case-by-case basis, depending on 
whether or not the individual qualifies as having a “special interest.”95 
Justice Marshall’s note in Dartmouth that “the students are fluctuating, and 
no individual among our youth has a vested interest in the institution, which 
can be asserted in a court of justice”96 has been the arm that has allowed the 
court to deny students who claim a “special interest” to gain standing.97 
Derivative actions are also unavailable to students, as they are not a 
membership-based entity.98  
The Case against Wilson College’s Board of Trustees 
There is, however, precedent available for holding directors 
accountable for neglecting their duties. Wilson’s College was a private 
college chartered by the Pennsylvania legislature.99 The Board of Trustees 
voted to close the university due to financial constraints and to change the 
corporate name to “Wilson College Foundation,” which would receive the 
university’s corporate assets to invest them to “continue to work toward the 
aims of Wilson College . . . [the purpose for which], as stated by its 
founders . . . [was] to provide for women the opportunity for broad and 
thorough education of the highest quality.”100 The decision was rooted in a 
declining number of prospective students seeking admission.101 
A coalition was formed to challenge the decision by seeking court 
interference through injunctive relief.102 A dissenting trustee, alumnae, 
faculty, enrolled students, and not yet matriculated students not only sought 
injunctive relief, but also asked that Wilson College be made a co-
petitioner.103 The judge gave standing to everyone except the current and 
prospective students.104 
The petitioners argued that “the very act of voting to close the College 
and then without Court approval proceeding to implement that decision . . . 
94. Ghahramani, supra note 19, at 22.
95. See Gary, supra note 35, at 627.
96. Ghahramani, supra note 19, at 23.
97. Miller v. Alderhold, 184 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 1971).
98. Sarah R. Kusiak, The Case for A.U. (Accountable Universities): Enforcing
University Administrator Fiduciary Duties Through Student Derivative Suits, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 129, 156 (2006). 
99. Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin County Legal J. 27, 29 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 1979).
100. Id. at 70-71.
101. Fred M. Hechinger, Wilson College, A ‘Lost Cause,’ Looks Lively, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1980, at C1. 
102. Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 28, 30-34, 37.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 84.
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was totally detrimental to the charter purpose of Wilson College and 
grounds for judicial removal”105 and that the evidence showed “established 
a history of mismanagement.”106 As a result, the petitioners wanted the 
trustees to “show cause [as to] why they should not be removed 
immediately as trustees”107 and why they should not be “permanently 
enjoined from implementing the closing of the college.”108 
Through the cy-près doctrine, the court acknowledged the petitioners 
need for the court to issue approval for any “fundamental change to a nature 
of a nonprofit corporation, which the respondents had not sought.”109 In 
their opinion, the court wrote: 
“By implementing the decision to close Wilson College the Trustees 
attempted to essentially deprive the Court of its power to review the 
recommendation of the Board and to approve or disapprove the proposed 
diversion of college assets from a teaching institution to some other 
charitable use. In addition, the implementation of the decision to close 
Wilson College without prior approval of the Court attempted to deprive 
the public, represented by the Attorney General as parens patriae, of an 
opportunity to comment upon or protest the decision.”110 
The court didn’t dismiss the entire board as they didn’t find evidence 
of dealing in bad faith (evidence of “fraudulent conduct or dishonest 
acts”).111 The college president, though, was found to have acted with 
“gross abuse of authority and discretion,” which resulted in her permanent 
removal from the board.112 Another member was found to have conflicting 
interests through their presidency at Bryn Mawr College, which presented 
“proper cause” for their removal as well.113 Wilson College was enjoined 
from closing without court approval, and Wilson College was forbidden 
from paying respondents’ court fees.114 
THE 2019 COLLEGE ADMISSIONS SCANDAL AND THE  
LACK OFMONITORING 
As this analysis has shown, fiduciary law requires a duty of care from 
all trustees, requiring trustees to conduct directorial functions that an 
ordinarily prudent person would exercise in a like position and under 
105. Id. at 83.
106. Id.
107. Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 28.
108. Id.
109. Ghahramani, supra note 19, at 25.
110. Zehner v. Alexander, 3 Franklin County Legal J. at 82.
111. Id. at 83-84.
112. Id. at 83.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 86.
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similar circumstances.115 Encompassed in this duty is responsibility of 
oversight, requiring all directors to know of the inner functions of their 
corporation, regardless of how far removed from operations they are.  
With respect to Operation Varsity Blues, it is clear that a majority of 
universities involved breached their duty of oversight by failing to 
supervise their admissions process. Athletic departments were not overseen 
by any sort of regulatory figure within the university, allowing for a side-
door to be utilized by prospective students and their parents. While a 
director may be far removed from the processes of athletic recruitment, 
there still should have been enough oversight by the admissions department 
to not only vet the prospective students to the same degree as other students, 
but also to validate their credentials for admission.  
An additional layer of oversight could simply be transparency in 
money donated to specific athletic departments. A pivotal move in the side-
door scheme was donating a large sum of money to specific athletic 
divisions of the university, which the coach or head of the department 
accepted and utilized to his or her own benefit. The universities should have 
maintained their duty of oversight by requiring financial reports from each 
department to inform them of any illegal or fraudulent activity within their 
colleges. In the case of Georgetown University and Gordon Ernst, the 
college found out about Ernst’s conduct in 2017 and remedied the issue by 
removing him from his position.116 But no further action was taken to fix 
the lack of oversight.117 With no active oversight, Rick Singer was able to 
keep his charade going for far too long. 
Furthermore, the boards of trustees also conjunctively violated their 
duties of loyalty. The duty of loyalty requires trustees to pursue what is in 
the best interest of the corporation they serve and not act in self-dealing. If 
the directors knew (or implicitly knew) of the corrupt practice of utilizing 
Singer’s “side-door” for admissions, they breached their duty of loyalty. 
The best interests of a university are maintained by promoting a certain 
level of integrity in their admissions process and taking bribes on the side 
in no way mirrors that.  
RECOMMENDED ACTION 
It is apparent that boards have taken little initiative to incorporate 
transparency into the university admissions process, and as such, there 
should be a policy shift in order to encourage universities to move into this 
115. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 959 (1996).
116. Alex Lewontin & Nick Gavio, Nationwide Admissions Scandal Implicates Former
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important realm of honesty. It was once thought that the biggest incentive 
for boards of trustees was image, as serving on college and university 
boards signals wealth and status to one’s peers.118 In the face of public 
controversies, board reputations suffer.119 This observation, however, 
addresses the aftermath of the problem rather than preventing the 
wrongdoing in the first place. As a result, university presidents and boards 
of trustees need to be encouraged to make an ethical admission process an 
important agenda topic.  
To make this a priority in their university governance agenda, the next 
three sections suggest three methods of encouraging university admissions 
transparency. The first two recommendations are through extensions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which would impose liability on specific board 
members or university presidents for not maintaining accurate reporting or 
codes of conduct. The last proposal is a compensation incentive for the 
president, encouraging voluntary action. The first two actions work as a 
metaphorical stick, while the other works as a carrot. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Section 302 
In the late 1990s, the burst of the stock market bubble uncovered a 
widespread problem of financial fraud within public companies. Through 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress imposed new standards of 
accountability for boards of directors as well as corporate officers.120 The 
new law encompassed requirements for corporate ethics and civil and 
criminal penalties for non-compliance.121 The purpose of the law is simply 
put: “An Act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability 
of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other 
purposes.”122 While the purpose of the act is simple, the composition is not. 
For the purposes of this note, the analysis will focus on the two components 
of the law that are best suited to impose a duty of oversight through 
statutory means: corporate responsibility for financial reports and codes of 
conduct. 
Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports 
The second component of Sarbanes-Oxley establishes corporate 
responsibility for financial reports by requiring an individual within the 
company to vouch for the accuracy of the internal audits and reports. This 
118. ROBERT E. MARTIN, THE COLLEGE COST DISEASE: HIGHER COST AND LOWER 
QUALITY, 102-103 (2011). 
119. Id.
120. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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is imposed on two roles: “the principal executive officer or offices and the 
principal financial officer or officers, or person performing similar 
functions.”123 Thus, following the completion of reports, the CEO and CFO 
are required to sign a statement saying that “to the best of the signer’s 
knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement that is 
material, or neglect to include any fact that would help to make any 
statement in the report ‘not misleading.’”124 If invalid for any reason, the 
CEO and CFO are required to give back any bonus or equity they received, 
as well as all profit made on their sale of company stock within the twelve 
months prior to the date of certification.125 This does not include any 
consequences imposed by the corporation itself.126 
If this component of Sarbanes-Oxley were expanded to universities, it 
would require accuracy and transparency in the admissions process. By not 
including details of monetary contributions geared towards a side-door 
admission via athletic programs, the university would be making untrue 
statements about the financial integrity of the university as well as the level 
playing field for the admissions process. In addition, they would not be 
including facts that would make the statements in the report not misleading. 
The fourth component of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that “two officials 
have design[ed] and implement[ed] the ‘internal controls’ that they believe 
are necessary to ensure that all material information . . . [has] been provided 
to them and included in the reports, and have tested those controls to see if 
they are working.’”127 While most corporations are able to satisfy this 
element through an internal structure that is then submitted to an audit by 
an accounting firm, the same is not required to be mirrored in non-profit 
entities.128 Furthermore, the meaning of “internal controls” is largely 
subjective and up to the corporations discretion on how to create and 
maintain them. “Like the speck of dust held by Horton, the simple words 
‘internal controls’ contain a universe.”129 
To satisfy part of the fourth requirement, a university could engage an 
external auditor to review and verify financial statements. More 
importantly, and integral to the admissions scandal, however, would be 
employing internal auditors, who not only would ensure financial 
information accuracy, but also that all parts of the organization are 
complying with laws, regulations, policies, and procedures. If the internal 
123. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241(1998 & West Supp.
2004)).  
124. Id.
125. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241(1998 & West Supp.
2004)). 
126. Carl Oxholm III, Sarbanes-Oxley in Higher Education: Bringing Corporate
America’s “Best Practices” to Academia, 31 J.C. & U.L. 351, 358 (2005). 
127. Id.
128. Id. at 359.
129. Id.
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auditors were unable to validate the internal levers and controls of the 
university, the board would be alerted. 
To expand the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to universities, the requirement for 
a signatory to validate a form as a hook for liability could be added to a 
Form 990, which is an informational tax form that tax-exempt entities are 
required to file annually.130 Not only would the signatory create liability, 
but it would resolve the issue of standing by encouraging state attorney 
generals to impose civil and criminal penalties like they do on for-profit 
institutions. 
If the compliance initiative proposed by Section 302 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act were broadened to both encompass non-profit corporations as 
well as universities, signatories who either failed to implement a thorough 
internal audit system or signed off on reports that were inaccurate or 
misleading would be subject to severe penalties, both through civil and 
criminal penalties as well as penalties imposed by the university itself. In 
turn, the university would both be incentivized to choose leaders who were 
highly ethical as repeated mistakes by university leaders (and subsequent 
penalties) are fodder for the media and could hurt admissions.  
Moreover, society would not only see a shift in the ethics of the 
admissions processes but also in the proactivity of both boards of trustees 
as well as university presidents or chancellors. “. . . A prudent president 
will assess the institution’s financial systems to identify the areas in which 
it is most at risk for holes and ‘disloyal’ conduct.” Through the imposition 
of Sarbanes-Oxley, there would be no room for a claim of a violation of the 
duty of oversight. University leaders would be conscious of the inner 
workings of each department because of the thorough process they would 
carefully create and deploy.   
University Presidents as Compensated Gatekeepers 
While the aforementioned resolutions are a form of ensuring 
transparency every step of the way, incentivizing the president to act as a 
gatekeeper could also produce this result. While university presidents are 
not technically a part of the board of trustees, they are selected by 
unanimous agreement of the trustees.131 The board usually gives the 
president governing guidelines, but the president has the authority to make 
decisions using their own discretion.132 Their role largely mirrors the role 
130. Barbara Weltman, The Purpose of IRS Form 990, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 29, 2019,
9:12 PM), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/083115/purpose-irs-for 
m-990.asp [https://perma.cc/VC29-QZYJ].
131. Nick Price, The Roles and Responsibilities of a Board of Directors for a College
or University, BOARD EFFECT (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.boardeffect.com/blog/roles-resp 
onsibilities-board-directors-college-university/ [https://perma.cc/5SER-N5QC]. 
132. Id.
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of a CEO.133 As an arm of the board, one such proposal could take the form 
of a president gatekeeper, who would be enabled and incentivized to 
prioritize transparency in the admissions process by increased 
compensation. A “president gatekeeper” would be empowered to work 
independently to ensure that the admissions process is done ethically and 
with integrity. The logic behind this parallels executive pay-for-
performance incentives.134  
One of the biggest differences between boards of directors and 
university presidents, however, is equity-based compensation.135 Equity 
based compensation allows directors and executives to root themselves in 
the long-term success of the business, thereby incentivizing them to work 
diligently, responsibly, and reach high levels of success. This form of 
compensation is absent in universities; presidents have salaries and cash-
based performance bonuses.  
Cash-based incentives aren’t effective at promoting ethical 
management for two reasons. Firstly, the size of existing compensation 
packages mean that any additional incentives are just drops in the bucket. 
Secondly, university presidents should already be incentivized to promote 
ethical behavior in admissions because of their base salary being 
presumably tied to a code of ethics. An illustration of this is the former 
President of the University of Southern California. The University of 
Southern California has a Code of Ethics, which commits university 
employees to discharging obligations in a “fair and honest manner” as well 
as “respecting the rights and dignity of all persons.”136 As such, the 
university president would likely be bound to these obligations. In 2017, 
prior to Operation Varsity Blues’ publicity, the President of the University 
of Southern California made a base salary of $1,467,330 and earned a bonus 
of $239,612, resulting in total compensation of $2,404,232.137 Presumably 
since the President was bound to terms of ethics, the idea of fostering 
morality in the admissions process would have been within the scope of his 
employment. Creating an incentive program for a university president to 
encourage the idea of an ethical admissions process would throw money at 
presidents to just do the job they were hired to do. 
The idea of establishing the university president as a compensated 
gatekeeper, therefore, appears hard to execute effectively, given the 
133. Id.
134. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives – It’s Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. J. (last visited Feb 8. 2020), https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-
incentives-its-not-how-much-you-pay-but-how?fbclid=IwAR2FL_2N87LSyG3vKD 
DoxhNWHdpQuYXJ2eKi4JDn-xUvY2p2mVYdFzrcHps [https://perma.cc/Q4EF-JAXR]. 
135. Dan Bauman, et al., Executive Compensation at Public and Private Colleges, THE 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (last visited Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/ 
interactives/executive-compensation#id=table_private_2017 [https://perma.cc/HSS8-7QWL].  
136. USC Code of Ethics, https://policy.usc.edu/ethics/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
137. Bauman, et al., supra note 135.
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existing compensation these figures receive. As a result, we are left with 
the strongest method for incentivizing more comprehensive oversight being 
the extension of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
CONCLUSION 
Daniel Golden and Doris Burke wrote about Operation Varsity Blues 
in the Washington Post, asserting a need for universities to take 
responsibility for their role in the matter.138  
Such allegedly criminal tactics represent the logical, if extreme, 
outgrowth of practices that have been prevalent under the surface of college 
admissions, and that undermine the American credos of upward mobility 
and equal opportunity. Although top college administrators and admissions 
officials were apparently unaware of the deception, their institutions do 
bear some responsibility for developing and perpetuating the system that 
made it possible.139  
This paper functions off of a similar premise—that the university and its 
board of trustees are there to safeguard the interests, integrity, and reputation 
of the university. Those boards involved in the scandal did not safeguard the 
interests of their universities, but rather violated their duty of care. 
As of today, a couple of student initiated court decisions are pending 
in court and the only repercussions for those involved are criminal penalties 
for Rick Singer and parents who utilized Singer’s service.140 While the 
universities themselves aren’t being held accountable for their role in the 
ordeal, other universities are beginning to engage in proactive measures. 
Southern Methodist University began independently investigating students 
with ties to Rick Singer and his college-counseling firm.141 
This paper, however, functions on the premise that an internal review 
of students’ associations with Rick Singer is not enough to satisfy a duty of 
oversight. A duty of oversight encourages directors to serve for the benefit of 
the university, as well as to have a keen eye for its internal health. This 
obligation is imposed by the extension of fiduciary duties to nonprofit entities 
and overcoming an issue with lack of standing through a similar extension of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that directly implicates a trustee who hasn’t 
satisfied their fiduciary duties. If anything has become evident through 
138. Daniel Golden, He investigated how rich buy their way into elite colleges. Some




140. Tamboura v. Singer, Docket No. 5:19-cv-03411 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
141. Connor Pitman, National college admissions scandal leads to letter from R. Gerald 
Turner, SMU DAILY CAMPUS (Oct. 29, 2019, 5:32 PM), https://www.smudailycampus.com/ 
news/national-college-admissions-scandal-leads-to-letter-from-r-gerald-turner [https://per 
ma.cc/8XSQ-T39F]. 
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Operation Varsity Blues, it’s that action is required to ensure a fair playing 
field for university applicants. With little incentive for trustees to correct their 
own errors and avoid an Operation Varsity Blues II, it is up to the state to 
pursue a way to hold boards of trustees to a higher standard. 
